We present a model that integrates the discrete working time choice of heterogenous households into a general equilibrium setting where wages are determined by sectoral bargaining between firms and trade unions. The model is calibrated to German micro and macro data. We then use it to analyse stylised policy reforms that are designed to stimulate labour supply. The model is calibrated to German micro and macro data. We then use it to analyse stylised policy reforms that are designed to stimulate labour supply. In the first scenario, the basic social assistance (SA) rate ("Regelsatz") is cut by 50 per cent for all household members (adults and children). In the second scenario, individuals with large child care responsibilities, i.e. single parents with more than one child and women in couple households with more than one child, are exempted from the SA rate cut. In both cases, we report macroeconomic changes as well as effects on the participation rate, average working hours and labour supply for different subsets of households.
Introduction
The tax and benefit system ranks prominently among the factors that are presented to explain the high levels of unemployment in many European countries. One important problem is recognised with work disincentives at the lower end of the earnings distribution. There are mainly two reasons why the transfer paid to every citizen who is not able to earn their living on their own often works as a barrier to employment. First, benefit payments are high compared to the incomes that low skilled workers can earn in the labour market, and second, benefit withdrawal rates are often close to 100 per cent, i.e. additional income earned leads to a one-to-one reduction in benefit payments. Together these two elements create "poverty traps", which keep benefit recipients within the welfare system instead of promoting their transition into employment. This problem has been highlighted both in academics and politics, and has given rise to a variety of reform proposals: a reduction in social assistance rates, a reduction in the replacement rate or the duration of unemployment insurance payments, several variants of a negative income tax, an income allowance for social security contributions, or the promotion of special "mini" or "midi" jobs in the low income sector. The assessment of policy proposals must take into account direct labour supply effects and indirect wage and labour demand effects. A suitable analytical approach must thus contain both "micro" parts (the individual decisions in heterogeneous households) and "macro" parts (market interactions in the whole economy).
At the micro level of labour supply, recent econometric work has focused on the simultaneous analysis of participation and hours of work decisions under nonconvex budget constraints (see Blundell and MacCurdy, 1999 , for a survey). This question has usually been approached in model settings where households choose between a fixed number of labour supply options, among them non-participation. Reaction coefficients are then estimated by discrete choice methods, whereas incomes for alternative labour market options are treated as exogenous parameters.
By combining a discrete-choice labour supply model with a net income calculator, one arrives at behavioural microsimulation models that can be used to assess the reform effects in the tax and transfer system at given wages. The strength of microsimulation models is the very detailed modelling of the individual households' budget constraints. They can thus account for the fact that the decisions of partners in couple households also depend upon the labour market status and options of the spouse. However, microsimulation models are typically not closed, i.e. there is no mechanism to assure a macroeconomic equilibrium.
In contrast, macroeconomic work has focused on price and wage changes and their impact on labour demand. Labour supply is often treated in a very rough way in macroeconomic studies. It is either accommodated by the assumption of a representative household or even treated as completely exogenous. This means that labour supply is neither differentiated between persons and hours nor between different households.
The model we describe in this paper is an attempt to integrate microsimulation models with heterogeneous households and macrosimulation models. The model ist able to (1) cover the main features of reforms in the tax and transfer system, (2) describe the behavioural reaction on the micro level, and (3) determine the general equilibrium effects on wages and employment. To this end, we construct an applied general equilibrium model (AGE) with 26 different households, each representing a different socioeconomic group. Each person has to decide on the amount of labour supplied to the market and chooses from a small number of working time options, among them non-participation. The net income associated with each working time option is endogenously determined and depends on flexible producer wages as well as taxes and transfers. This labour supply module is combined with a bargaining setup for wage determination and embedded in a standard AGE model in the tradition of Shoven and Whalley (1984) . The AGE approach provides a comprehensive and consistent framework of production and consumption interactions in the economy and has become the standard tool for the analysis of the economy-wide impacts of policy measures on resource allocation and the associated implications for incomes of economic agents (for surveys on the use of AGE models in different policy fields, see Shoven and Whalley, 1992, Pereira and Shoven, 1992, Kehoe and Kehoe, 1994, or Weyant, 1999) .
The model in this paper extends former work (Böhringer, Boeters, and Feil, 2002) by using the AGE model PACE-L as its basis. The Dutch MIMIC model (Graafland et al., 2001 ) provides us with a central idea which we use in setting up the households' utility functions. We also utilise the ZEW's microsimulation model , which consists of a net income calculator and a logit labour supply estimation based on van Soest (1995). The model is 'micro', because the household submodel is built on individual data and calibrated to results from a discrete choice model. It is 'macro', because it uses the representative agent assumption and is closed.
Micro-macro modelling strategies have become increasingly popular over the last decade (see e.g. Dixon, Malakelis, and Meagher, 1996, or Baekgaard and Robinson, 1997). In most cases, they are motivated by distributional concerns, in particular in development economics (for a survey see Davies, 2003 In Davies's terms, our approach falls into the plain "AGE" class, but cannot be classified as "AGE microsimulation", because we do not simulate the behaviour of each individual household in the original data set. Nevertheless, the use of microsimulation data to calibrate the AGE model is an important part of our modelling approach. Together with the MIMIC model it is the only attempt to combine heterogeneous, discrete labour supply and an economy-wide model with full endogeneity of all major economic variables.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In Sections 2 and 3, we describe in detail the core labour supply elements of the model and their calibration to the output of a microsimulation model. Section 4 then gives a brief overview of the general equilibrium model in which the labour supply module is embedded.
Section 5 reports the results of some illustrative policy simulations of cuts in the social assistance. In Section 6, we summarise and draw conclusions. An appendix provides additional information about the aggregation structure of the model and the German tax and transfer system.
A model of discrete working time choice
The core element of our model is a labour supply module in which we distinguish 26 household types according to household composition and skill of the members, 10 of them single households and 16 couple households. More information is provided in Table 3 in the appendix. Each individual (single or member of a household)
can choose from a fixed number of discrete labour supply options. For single males without children and for married males, there are three labour supply options. For all other household types (married women, single females without children and singles with children) there are five options. The discrete options have been chosen so that they correspond to the empirical distribution of labour supply behaviour of the different types of individuals (Buslei and Steiner, 1999) . For all individuals the first option is non-participation (zero hours of work). All options are summarised in Table   4 in the appendix.
Each household is characterised by a utility function that consists of two additive parts. The first one is a CES part, which depends on leisure and consumption, as in the standard neoclassical labour supply model. The second part is linear in the absolute difference between actual and desired working time. Through the parameter of desired working time, we generate heterogeneity within household types.
Algebraically, the utility for a single household i of type j supplying labour in hours category k is calculated as
where ® 
with ® With these probabilities, we calculate average consumption C j (h j;k ) over the three labour market states (employed, unemployed with or without unemployment benefit entitlement) and for all working time categories k; applying the rules of the German tax and transfer system. This average consumption is used as an approximation for the expected utilities. More detail concerning the calculation of the disposable income is provided in the appendix. For each hours of work option we then calculate the CES part of the utility function, U work in the lower hours-of-work category from those who work in the upper category. We denote the critical value ofh j;i for household type j between hours of work category k and k + 1 withh j;k;k+1 and calculate it as
If the CES utility for both hours-of-work options is the same, the critical value ofh will lie exactly half way between both. If one CES utility is higher than the other, the critical value ofh j will be asymmetrical, and the extent of the asymmetry will For couple households, working time is determined in an analogous manner.
Each couple household can choose among 15 working time options (3 for the man, 5 for the woman). We disassemble the simultaneous maximisation problem of the household into two independent working time choices of the partners by assuming that when one partner chooses their optimal working time, they take the other partner's income and leisure to be constant at their conditional expected values given the benchmark probabilities. 1 In this way, we obtain independent critical values of h for both partners.
Due to data restrictions in the microsimulation model that we use to calibrate the labour supply module, only about 60% of total labour supply is captured. Therefore, in the general equilibrium model, the labour supply module is complemented with an additional aggregate household with fixed labour supply, which accounts for the rest (see Section 4.1). 1 The simultaneous maximisation of female and male working hours would encounter difficulties because multiple local maxima are possible. (Given that the woman works longer, it is optimal for the man to work less, and vice versa.) This would require an explicit comparison of absolute utility values, which doesn't match well with the overall mixed-complementarity set-up of the numerical model. Furthermore, it is likely to result in discontinuous reactions of the households, when they switch from one local equilibrium to another. h is discontinuous at the critical value, the elasticity of the model will be different whether we increase or lower the wage. We take the average of these two reactions to match the empirical elasticities,
where f k is the density ofh betweenh k−1;k andh k;k+1 ; and " k is the corresponding empirical elasticity.
In equation (3) we have three free parameters, ® L j ; ¾ j and¯j: (For couples, the calibration procedure is the same, except that there are five parameters, ® 
Labour Market
In each of 7 production sectors, wages are determined by sector-specific bargaining between an employers' association and a trade union. As is usual in the trade union literature (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991, Ch.2), we represent the bargaining outcome as the maximisation of a Nash function, which includes the objective functions of both parties and their respective fallback options. We adopt the "right to manage" approach: Parties bargain over wages, and firms decide over labour demand given the bargained wage. The labour demand reaction in turn is anticipated in the wage bargaining.
The Nash bargaining solution is obtained by solving
where Ω s : Nash maximand in sector s, ¼ s : profits of representative firm, Γ i;s : union utility of workers of type i (i = L; H), ½ i;s : bargaining power of workers of type i, w i;s : producer wage for skill type i.
In each sector, the firm's objective is its profit, ¼ s . We assume that the firm's fallback option is no production and, thus, zero profits. The union represents two types of workers, high skilled and low skilled (indexed by i). For each skill type, the union's objective function is employment, L i;s ; times the value of a job, V i;s ; minus the value of unemployment, V i;U :
As is customary in the search model literature (see e.g. Pissarides, 1990) , V i;s and V U;i are calculated as value functions, which are defined recursively and then solved for their steady state values:
where r: discount rate, ¹ s : separation rate in sector s;¸s: matching rate. AIE i;s is the average disposable income of an employed worker in sector s; where the average is calculated over all household types and positive hours-of-work categories. AIU i is the average disposable income of an unemployed worker, averaging over the cases of unemployment benefit and social assistance recipients. Note that AIU i and V i;U are independent of sectors. Unemployed workers are mobile between sectors and in equilibrium must be indifferent with regards to in which sector to search for a job.
The¸s's adjust so as to warrant this indifference (while the ¹ s are exogenously fixed). As usual in dual-labour-market type models, this results in the relation that the higher the "surplus from working" is in a sector, the lower the matching rate must be (see Acemoglu 2001) . By solving (5) and (6), we can express V i;s and V i;U as weighted averages of the expected incomes in the two labour market states.
Maximising the Nash objective (4) yields one first order condition (FOC) for each skill group and sector:
We use uncompensated own-and cross-price labour demand elasticities,´i j ; to write the FOCs in a compact form. Both bargaining parties know that firms will increase their output price when wages rise, leading to a fall in output. For collective bargaining, the relevant output price elasticity is the elasticity of industry output, not the individual firm's output. The nesting structure of both production and consumption requires a numerical approximation of the relevant price elasticities. We calculate the latter at the benchmark point and use these values as parameters in subsequent policy counterfactuals.
For low-skilled labour the FOC in compact form then is
where t l;s : social security contribution as a payroll tax, w i;s : wage gross of wage income taxes,w i;s : consumer wage; t wm;i : total marginal effect of tax and transfer system, r: capital market discount rate. The FOC for high-skilled labour has an analogous form.
We assume that the trade union is utilitarian with respect to the different house- 
Firms
In each production sector, a representative firm produces a homogenous output.
The production function is of the nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) Each individual firm is assumed to be small in relation to its respective sector.
All firms in one sector interact through monopolistic competition, i.e. they produce individual variants of the sectoral output good that attract different consumers.
This means that firms can exploit market power in their respective market segment.
Producer output prices then consist of costs (of the three primary inputs as well as intermediary inputs) plus a fixed mark-up.
Cost minimisation yields demand functions for the primary factors at the sectoral level and corresponding uncompensated (own and cross) price elasticities for labour that are used in the Nash bargaining FOCs (8) . Capital and labour are mobile across sectors. The market for capital is perfectly competitive. Our basic assumption is that capital is internationally immobile, which reflects a short-to medium-run model horizon. Labour mobility is modelled in a dual-labour-market fashion. In the presence of cross-sector wage differentials, hypothetical sector specific unemployment rates (application queues) are adjusted so as to make the unemployed indifferent between sectors.
Private Households
We distinguish the 26 worker households described in the appendix A.1, one dummy household with fixed labour supply, which accounts for the households not covered by the microsimulation model, and a capitalist household. The capitalist household receives all capital and profit income. Capitalists decide over consumption and investment according to the approach of Ballard et al. (1985) . Their utility function is calibrated to empirical saving elasticities (Bernheim 2001 ). Worker households do not save.
The structure of consumption is assumed to be identical across all households.
Aggregate consumption is distributed among the different consumption goods according to a CES function. Each consumption good is composed of the Armington goods (see Section 4.5) in fixed proportions given by the value shares from the Z-matrix of national accounting. In the same manner, the investment good is a fixed-coefficient composite of all Armington goods.
Government
The main focus in the model of this paper is on the complex tax and transfer system for private households. The detailed budget constraints of the households are calculated in a special programme module (see the appendix A.4). The budget constraints are then linearly approximated through two sets of parameters: an average and a marginal tax and transfer rate for each household type in each labour supply category and each labour market state (employed, unemployed with or without unemployment benefit entitlement).
Apart from the taxes and transfers for the private households, the government collects the following taxes: a uniform capital input tax, a profit tax and an output tax in production, and a differentiated consumption tax on all consumption commodities. Tax rates are calibrated to correspond to the tax revenue statistics of the benchmark year 1997. The government budget contains the revenue from all these taxes, the public purchases of goods and the balance of payments surplus or deficit.
The public budget is balanced by a hypothetical lumpsum transfer. We fully allocate this transfer to the capitalist household in order to circumvent the question of how to distribute it among the various worker household types. 
Foreign Trade

Illustrative Simulations:
Cuts in the social assistance payments
To illustrate the working mechanisms of the model, we present simulations of two very simple policy measures that both cut the social assistance payments, but to a different extent. The simulations (especially the first one) are not meant to represent a realistic policy reform, but to produce model results that lend themselves to a straightforward interpretation. These basic effects can then serve to explain the outcomes of more complex policy reforms. We investigate realistic policy reform scenarios in the companion paper Boeters, Gürtzgen and Schnabel (2003).
In Scenario 1, the basic social assistance (SA) rate ("Regelsatz") is cut by 50 per cent for all household members (adults and children). Housing and heating subsidies as well as transfer withdrawal regulations remain unchanged. (See the appendix A.5 for some more details about the German SA system.) In Scenario 2, the basic SA rate is cut by 50 per cent only for adult SA recipients who are able to work.
Single parents with more than one child and women in couple households with more than one child are assumed to be unable to work due to child care responsibilities.
For those persons the benchmark basic SA rate remains unchanged. Compared to Scenario 1, in Scenario 2 households with children are therefore less likely to be affected by the reform, since the basic SA rate of children remains unchanged and couple households with more than 1 child only face a reduction in the basic SA rate of the household head.
Compared to a pure labour supply analysis, we are especially interested in two kinds of effects. First, how will the wages react to changes in the labour supply, and how they feed back to the labour supply decision itself? Second, what the effects of the necessary budget balancing are? In general, the policy measure in question, taken for itself, will result in a deficit or surplus of the public budget. This results from both direct effects (lower SA payments in our case) and indirect effects (possibly higher wage income tax revenues due to higher employment). In our simulations, we assume that the net effect of these tax revenue changes is balanced by an adjustment of the general income tax. We uniformly raise or cut the marginal tax rate on profits, capital and labour income so that public expenditures remain unchanged.
We first describe in detail the results from Scenario 1, where SA payments are Table 1 can be interpreted in a straightforward way. Labour supply rises as we would expect when the option of not working becomes less attractive. When we focus on the part of the working population that is captured in our labour supply module, the labour supply increases are 0.9% (low skilled) and 0.5% (high skilled). It is plausible that low skilled workers show a much more pronounced effect than the high skilled, because high-skilled workers have higher opportunity costs and use the option of not working less frequently. Together with the last third of the labour force, whose labour supply is assumed to be fixed, we arrive at aggregate labour supply effects of 0.6% and 0.3%, respectively. Through the wage bargaining system, this higher labour supply translates into both lower unemployment (decreases in the unemployment rate by 0.3 and 0.1 percentage points for low and high skilled) and lower wages. The driving force for the wage cut is that the fallback option of the trade unions decreases with lower SA payments and -prior to wage adjustment -higher unemployment. In our simulations the relative decrease in wages is even higher than the relative increase in employment (producer wages go down by 1.2% and 1.0%, respectively). This means that aggregate labour income, and also the functional income share of labour, shrinks in spite of higher employment.
As we assume the capital stock to be fixed within the period of labour supply adjustment, the interest rate increases due to higher labour input, and so does the income share of capital. This produces two effects that add to a shift in the spending pattern from consumption (which in fact decreases) to investment. A higher interest rate makes future consumption relatively more attractive, and income is redistributed from worker households to capital owners, who have a higher saving rate.
With respect to the public budget, there is initially a tax revenue surplus, which results both from the cut in the social benefit payments and in higher overall tax Table 2 shows the changes in participation rates, average working time and total labour supply (measured in hours) for different subsets of households. For all households, there is an increase in labour supply. This overall effect has two components that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, the participation rate increases because of the lower attractiveness of the no-laboursupply option. This increase in the participation rate is between half and three quarters of a percentage point. The lowest increase is observed for married women, while low skilled workers (who, of course, partly overlap with married women) react most strongly. On the other hand, the average working time of those who supply work falls. This is a direct consequence of the basic model setup, where household heterogeneity is modelled as a linear preference parameter over working time. This means that all households who change from non-participation to participation in the labour market supply labour in the lowest positive time category. The average amount of labour time supply per household thus decreases. This decrease is lowest for married men, because they choose only between two working time categories that are close to the average (see Table 4 in the appendix). By contrast, married women and singles switch into working time categories that are considerably below the average.
With respect to the overall change in labour supply, we can observe the following differences between the household groups. Differentiated by marital status, the labour supply of married men and singles rises considerably more than that of married women. This can again mainly be explained by the construction of the working time categories, where only married women have the option to switch into a working time category with few hours. With respect to the skill groups, the supply of low skilled work increases more than that of high skilled work. The entries for total labour supply of low and high skilled workers in Table 2 match those in Table 1 .
Turning to Scenario 2 ("Sc.2" in Tables 1 and 2) , where social assistance payments are cut only for those individuals who are considered able to participate in the labour market, we see that, in general, economic effects are weakened. When we compare Columns "Sc.1" and "Sc.2" in Table 2 , we see that labour supply effects are reduced virtually uniformly across households. This is because the main effect is through the SA payments for children, which (for couples) affect the labour supply decision of both partners to the same extent. Compared to this effect, the differential treatment of men and women in couples is of minor importance.
The lower labour supply effects translate into a general mitigation of macroeconomic changes in Table 1 . In addition, both the wage and unemployment effects for the two skill groups are reversed. The fall in the producer wage for high skilled workers is higher than that for low skilled workers. Consequently, unemployment is reduced to a higher extent for high skilled workers. This is because those individuals that benefit from the mitigation of the SA cuts in Scenario 2 are disproportionately more often low than high skilled. In general, however, unemployment changes are very small in Scenario 2.
On a macroeconomic level, the mitigation of the cuts in SA payments amounts to roughly one third of the effects in Scenario 1. GDP increases by 0.14% instead of 0.21%, and the income tax cut that can be financed by the tax surplus through this reform is 0.21 percentage points instead of 0.30.
Conclusions
In this section we summarise the main advantages of our modelling approach compared to CGE models with a representative household on the one hand and microsimulation models without macroeconomic repercussions on the other. We then turn to some potential weaknesses of the current version of our model and briefly sketch options of extending the model.
In comparison to a CGE model with a representative household, the following features of our model deserve emphasis:
• The extensive and the intensive margin of labour can be distinguished. Changes in total labour supply are broken down into changes in the participation rate and changes in the average hours of work supplied, as in Table 2 in Section 5.
• For each individual household a complex budget constraint is formulated, so that the details of national tax and transfer systems can be integrated in the model. This is especially important for couple households, for which tax and transfer rules depend on the household composition as well as the labour market status of both partners.
• The separation of different household types and the integration of their individual budget constraints allows us to analyse policy reforms that concern the demographical details of the household composition. (E.g. differential treatment of households with and without children in our illustrative simulations.)
• The effects of tax and transfer policy changes on different household types can be analysed. In our simulation, we are able to report differentiated labour supply changes for married and unmarried workers, for high and low skilled workers and for households with and without children.
A comparison of our model to microsimulation models of labour supply highlights the following differences:
• Complex interactions in the whole economy are captured. Labour supply changes affect different sectors of the economy differently, with sectoral factor demand and international trade consequences. The public budget is affected both directly through reform policies and indirectly through their consequences throughout the whole economy.
• The interaction of labour supply and wage formation is identified as the main feedback channel. Changes in the transfer payments alter the union's fallback option in the firm-union wage-bargaining setup both directly and indirectly through labour supply effects. The resulting wage changes in turn affect the labour supply decision.
• The recycling of additional (or lacking) tax revenue is an integral part of the economic analysis. In our illustrative cases there is a primary budget surplus from two sources: lower public expenses for social assistance payments and higher tax revenues due to higher overall economic activity. This makes it possible to lower the income tax, which again produces general equilibrium effects. Alternative ways of recycling the tax revenue can be analysed with the same overall setup.
Although in principle, our model combines important features from both numerical general equilibrium modelling and microsimulation, there are still a number of potential shortcomings of the current approach. Their consequences must be further analysed and compared with those of alternative modelling strategies:
• As we use an a-priori disaggregation of households, this leaves us with some inflexibility. The appropriate aggregation structure might vary with the policy measure that is analysed. The aggregation structure chosen in this paper is well suited for policies that are differentiated along the lines of household composition, number of children or type of labour supplied (high or low skilled).
Other differentiation criteria, which are in principle available in the basic data set (e.g. age of the individuals, home region) and might be important for other policy measures, are not mirrored in our concrete aggregation.
• The functional form chosen to reproduce the labour-leisure choice imposes some restrictions on the labour supply behaviour. The parameterisation is such that simulated elasticities can only be approximated to a certain degree (see the comparison of simulated and calibrated elasticity values in the appendix).
More importantly, the function used to simulate the elasticities (logit) and the function in our model have incompatible consequences for some reactions of the households. If one option becomes less attractive and becomes thus less frequently chosen, in a logit setting this means that all other options become proportionally more frequent. In contrast, with the function presented in Section 2, only neighbouring options are affected.
• At present, gross monthly earnings of 400 C = are exempted from social security contributions. Income taxes are calculated on the basis of taxable income, which is obtained by substracting a standard deduction from gross earnings. To determine income taxes paid by each household type, we apply the present German income tax schedule to taxable earnings. For couple households, income tax legislation allows for marital income splitting: According to this method, the tax schedule is applied to half of the joint taxable income, while the resulting tax amount is doubled to obtain total income taxes paid by the couple.
Finally, disposable monthly earnings are obtained by adding transfer payments to net monthly labour earnings The most important transfer payments in Germany include unemployment insurance ("Arbeitslosengeld"), unemployment assis-tance ("Arbeitslosenhilfe"), social assistance ("Sozialhilfe"), housing benefits ("Wohngeld") and child benefits ("Kindergeld"). In our model, we account for unemployment benefits and assistance, social assistance and child benefits, while housing benefits are neglected.
In Germany, unemployment benefits (UB) are available for persons who have paid contributions to the statutory unemployment insurance for a minimum of one year. In particular, the duration of unemployment benefits depends on the unem- we proceed as follows: first, we assign SA payments to all voluntarily unemployed singles and to those couple households whose adult members are both voluntarily unemployed 3 . Second, for positive hours of labour supply we distinguish three labour market states: a person who supplies a positive number of hours worked may be employed, which will be denoted as state (e). If the individual does not find a job and becomes involuntarily unemployed, he or she may either be entitled to UB or UA (b) or receive SA payments (n). In a static model, we are not able to determine the entitlement to UB or UA due to former contributions to the statutory unemployment insurance. Instead, we assume that a person who becomes unemployed is entitled to unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance with an exogenous given probability P U and receives SA payments with probability (1 −P U ). In the former case, UB and UA payments are determined by the replacement ratio of the net income that corresponds to the chosen category of hours of labour supplied. More specifically, this replacement ratio is defined as a weighted average of UB and UA replacement rates where the weights are the respective empirical shares of persons entitled to UA or UB. SA payments, in contrast, do not depend on the category of hours supplied in the labour market.
The distinction of three labour market states requires that the value of disposable income for a particular category of working time has to be calculated as an expected value. For singles, the expected value of the disposable income for a particular category of hours of work supplied is determined as a weighted average of the disposable income values in the three labour market states (e; b and n), with the respective probabilities, P (i); i = e; b; n; as weights:
According to SA legislation, persons who are able to work are obliged to make any effort to support themselves. In particular, eligibility for SA payments requires that income from other sources fall short of some specified basic minimum income level.
As a consequence, persons who receive transfer payments from other sources may also be eligible for SA, if transfers from other sources are smaller than the specified minimum income level. However, while SA recipients may keep a small amount of earned labour incomes, transfer payments from other sources are fully deducted from SA payments.
The basic minimum income level is household-specific and depends on household size and composition. This minimum income is referred to as the "SA minimum income". More specifically, the SA minimum income specified to cover the so-called "socio-cultural" existence minimum consists of a basic rate ("Regelsatz") for each household member and a supplement covering housing and heating costs. Moreover, one-off payments for special needs may be added. The basic rate for each household member is referred to as the "basic SA rate". For the head of the household, for example, this rate currently amounts to about 300C = per month.
